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Abstract
Successful attempts to predict judges’ votes shed light into how legal decisions are made and, ultimately, into the behavior
and evolution of the judiciary. Here, we investigate to what extent it is possible to make predictions of a justice’s vote based
on the other justices’ votes in the same case. For our predictions, we use models and methods that have been developed to
uncover hidden associations between actors in complex social networks. We show that these methods are more accurate at
predicting justice’s votes than forecasts made by legal experts and by algorithms that take into consideration the content of
the cases. We argue that, within our framework, high predictability is a quantitative proxy for stable justice (and case)
blocks, which probably reflect stable a priori attitudes toward the law. We find that U.S. Supreme Court justice votes are
more predictable than one would expect from an ideal court composed of perfectly independent justices. Deviations from
ideal behavior are most apparent in divided 5–4 decisions, where justice blocks seem to be most stable. Moreover, we find
evidence that justice predictability decreased during the 50-year period spanning from the Warren Court to the Rehnquist
Court, and that aggregate court predictability has been significantly lower during Democratic presidencies. More broadly,
our results show that it is possible to use methods developed for the analysis of complex social networks to quantitatively
investigate historical questions related to political decision-making.
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Introduction
Could we replace a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court by an
algorithm that does not know anything about the law or the case at
hand, but has access to the remaining justices’ votes and to the
voting record of the court? Surely, the algorithm would not be able
to hear the case or write an opinion, but would it be able to mimic
the vote of the missing judge? Here, we investigate these questions
and discuss the implications for quantifying deviations from
‘‘ideal’’ judicial behavior and for getting quantitative insights into
the dynamics and historical evolution of the judiciary.
Questions of justice predictability have deep implications from
at least two perspectives: the perspective of decision theory and the
perspective of legal studies and political science. From a decision–
theory perspective, Supreme Court decisions are singular because,
in some ways, they are expected to be quasi–ideal. Indeed, justices
are expected to make rational decisions with almost perfect
information, that is, as perfect as one may possibly expect in any
complex real–world decision–making situation. Additionally, the
decision of one justice may be expected not to affect the decisions
of the others, that is, the decisions may be expected to be non–
strategic in a game–theoretic sense [1]. Despite all of this,
unanimous decisions are not the norm; and even when decisions of
the Court are unanimous, legal experts have difficulties in
predicting, not only that the vote will be unanimous, but even
the ‘‘sign’’ of the Court’s decision–in a study of the 2002 term of
the Supreme Court, experts incorrectly predicted the global
outcome of as many as 34.7% of the Court’s unanimous decisions
[2]. Even more puzzling, although consistent with empirical
evidence from real decision–making processes, are recent
observations that extraneous factors (such as the position of a
case within a session) affect judges’ decisions because of
psychological biases [3,4].
From the perspective of legal studies and political science, on
the other hand, scholars have argued that, by trying to predict the
behavior of judges, one can get insights into how legal decisions
are truly made [2,5,6]. This argument usually appears in the
framework of the ‘‘debate’’ between legalism and attitudinalism
(or, more broadly, legal realism), which argue, respectively, for
purely legal versus personal attitude explanations to justices’
decisions [7]. Within this debate, successful predictions based on
variables describing the case under consideration (such as the issue
area of the case or the ideological direction of the lower court
ruling) lend evidence to one theory or the other.
Here we take an approach that is complementary to these vote–
forecasting efforts. Specifically, we investigate whether and to what
extent it is possible to make predictions of a justice’s vote based on
the other justices’ votes in the same case (and the track record of
the court), independently of case content. To make our
predictions, we use methods that have been developed to analyze
complex social networks [8,9] and complex affiliation networks
[10,11], and that are able to uncover hidden associations between
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social actors (in this case, justices) [12]. We show that our
approach is more accurate at predicting justice’s votes than
forecasts made by legal experts and by algorithms that take into
consideration the content of the cases [2,5].
Moreover, we argue that a justice’s predictability relative to her
predictability in an equivalent ‘‘ideal court’’ provides a quantita-
tive proxy for stable voting blocks (groups of justices that vote
consistently the same way in groups of cases) [13–16], which
ultimately reflect stable a priori attitudes towards the law. We find
that Supreme Court justices are significantly more predictable
than one would expect from ‘‘ideally independent’’ justices in
‘‘ideal courts’’ [17]. Deviations from ideal behavior are most
prominent in divided 5–4 decisions, where justice blocks seem to
be most stable. We find evidence that different justices have
significantly different relative predictabilities (which suggests that
some justices are more stably associated to certain justice–case
blocks than others) and that justice relative predictability has
decreased during the 50–year period spanning from the Warren
Court to the Rehnquist Court. We also find that courts, as a
whole, have been significantly less predictable during Democratic
presidencies.
Court idealizations
In an ‘‘omniscient Court’’ [17], justices are perfectly rational
and free of preferences or attitudes, and have access to complete
information about the case at hand. Given these legalist
idealizations, all justices must reach the same conclusion and all
cases must result in unanimous decisions [17]. Of course, the
omniscient Court model is trivially refuted by the empirical
observation that not all cases result in unanimous decisions.
Therefore, one must relax some of the assumptions to account for
justice variability.
Still within the legalist idealization, one may assume that the
information available to justices is not perfect and/or that there is
some other source of uncertainty. In such an ‘‘ideal Court’’, each
justice evaluates, still free of ideology and independently of other
justices, the merits of a case taking into account, to the best of her
abilities and knowledge, law and precedent. Cases, on the other
hand, all raise rigorously new issues, so previous decisions cannot
‘‘easily’’ determine by themselves the outcome of the present case.
Without this assumption that each new case is intrinsically hard,
one might think, for example, of a situation where all cases are
identical and each justice votes the same every time, even in an
‘‘ideal Court.’’ The assumption of intrinsic difficulty of the cases
seems relatively weak given that: (i) the Supreme Court is mostly
an appellate court, with ultimate and discretionary appellate
jurisdiction over state and federal courts; (ii) even legal experts
have difficulties predicting court decisions [2].
Under these assumptions, the ruling on a case can be modeled
as a binomial process where each justice has the same probability q
of agreeing with the petitioner, so that ‘‘easy cases’’ (those with
q&0 or q&1) result in unanimous decisions, whereas ‘‘hard cases’’
(q&0:5) generally result in divided votes. The defining character-
istic of an ideal court is that justices’ votes are uncorrelated, that is,
the fact that two justices agree (or disagree) on one case carries no
information about their potential agreement on another case.
Because of the lack of correlations, the best possible algorithm to
predict the vote of a justice in an ideal court, given the vote of the
other eight, is the majority rule (one could in general do better
than the majority by estimating, from previous cases, the
distribution of q values; in practice, this requires more than 150
cases and is impractical) [18]: if the majority of the eight justices
agreed with the petitioner, predict agreement; if the majority
disagreed, predict disagreement; in case of a tie, toss a coin.
If the court is less than ideal and some of its justices cast votes
with a consistent bias, the decisions of individual justices become
more predictable because, given the vote of eight justices on a case,
one can use the track record of the court to classify the case into a
certain ‘‘block’’; then the track record of the ninth justice enables
one to assess what is her most likely decision for cases in that block.
In other words, bias introduces correlations between justices’
voting patterns, which in turn result in increased predictability.
From this perspective, the predictability of a justice with respect
to her predictability in an equivalent ideal court provides a
quantitative proxy for stable justice correlations, which ultimately
reflect a priori attitudes towards the law.
Stochastic block models for vote prediction
To assess to what extent votes of individual Supreme Court
justices are predictable due to stable correlations, we use methods
that have been developed to analyze complex social networks. In
particular, we adapt a method that is able to uncover unobserved
associations between actors (in this case, justices) in complex
networks [12]. The method relies on the assumption that justices
and cases can be grouped into ‘‘blocks,’’ which carry relevant
information about justices’ voting patterns [13–16]. Unlike
previous analyses of coalition formation in the Supreme Court
[16], we do not assume a priori which blocks are the most relevant
or even that there is a single or a few relevant block structures.
Rather, we assume that all blocks of justices and cases are possible
in principle, and use a Bayesian approach to correctly average
over them.
Consider the voting record Vn of a court up to case n. The
voting record can be represented as a matrix whose elements are
Vnij~1 if justice i (with i~1,2, . . . ,9) voted in favor of the
petitioner in case j (with jƒn), and Vnij~0 otherwise. We want to
predict the vote of a justice in case n (without loss of generality we
set this justice to be number 1), given the complete voting record of
the court up to case n{1 and the votes of the other eight justices
in case n. We denote this available information (or observation)
Vn\1, which is the same as Vn except that the vote of justice 1 in
case n, V
n\1
1n , is not defined.
Let’s assume that there is a potentially infinite collection M of
generative models that could plausibly explain the voting record of
the court (that is, that could generate observation Vn\1). Then, our
expectation for the probability of justice 1 voting in favor of the
petitioner in case n is
p(Vn1n~1jVn\1)~
ð
M
dMp(Vn1n~1jM)p(MjVn\1), ð1Þ
where p(Vn1n~1jM) is the probability that Vn1n~1 in a voting
history generated with model M[M, and p(MjVn\1) is the
plausibility of model M given our observation. Using Bayes
theorem, we can rewrite Eq. (1) as
p(Vn1n~1jVn\1)~
Ð
M dMp(V
n
1n~1jM)p(Vn\1jM)p(M)Ð
M dM ’p(V
n\1jM ’)p(M ’) , ð2Þ
where p(Vn\1jM) is the probability that modelM gives rise to Vn\1
among all possible voting histories, and p(M) is the a priori
probability that modelM is the one that actually gave rise to Vn\1.
The key to good predictions is to identify sets of models that are
general, empirically grounded, and analytically or computationally
tractable. We focus on the family MBM of stochastic block models
[12,19,20]. In a stochastic block model, justices and cases are
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partitioned into blocks and the probability that a justice votes in
favor of the petitioner in a case depends only on the blocks to
which the justice and the case belong (see Methods and Ref. [12]).
Under these conditions, the probability that justice 1 votes in
favor of the petitioner in case n is:
pBM(V
n
1n~1jVn\1)~
1
Z
X
PJ [PJ
PC[PC
ls1snz1
rs1snz2
 !
exp½{H(PJ ,PC) , ð3Þ
where the sum is over all possible partitions of the justices and
cases into blocks (PJ and PC , respectively), lab is the number of
votes favorable to the petitioner from justices in block a to cases in
block b, rab is the maximum number of such votes (that is, the
number of pairs justice–case such that the justice is in a and the
case is in b), s1 is the block of justice 1 (in partition PJ ), and sn is
the block of case n (in partition PC ).
The weighting function H(PJ ,PC) depends on the partitions
only
H(PJ ,PC)~
X
a,b
ln (rabz1)z ln
rab
lab
  
: ð4Þ
Because of the formal analogy of Eq. (3) with a thermal average
in statistical physics, one can estimate pBM (V
n
1n~1jVn\1) using
Metropolis sampling [12,21].
Results
We study the first 150 cases of each of the courts from the first
Warren Court (1953) to the last Rehnquist Court (1994–2004). We
use the data in the original Supreme Court Database compiled by
Spaeth and coworkers [22]. We restrict our analysis to ‘‘simple
cases’’ defined as those that verify: (i) all nine justices either voted
with the majority or dissented (cases with regular or special
concurrence, nonparticipation, or other voting behaviors are
excluded); and (ii) were formally decided with full opinions, that is,
were granted oral argument and resulted in a signed opinion. For
cases dealing with multiple issues, we consider only the main issue,
as defined in the database. We restrict ourselves to the first 150
cases of each court because few courts have seen more than 150
simple cases, so results become very noisy after that.
Justice predictability is higher in real courts than in ideal
courts
As discussed above, justice votes in ideal courts are uncorrelat-
ed, so the fact that two justices agree or disagree on one case
carries no information about their potential agreement on another
case. In such a scenario, the stochastic block model cannot possibly
extract any useful information from past votes, and we can expect
it to be at most as accurate as the majority rule. Conversely, in real
courts the majority rule is as accurate as in ideal courts because,
for this heuristic, the only relevant piece of information is how
many justices voted with the majority (for example, in a 6–3 vote,
the majority rule will always correctly predict six votes, and
incorrectly predict the other three); since the stochastic block
model does exploit the block–structure of the voting record, we
expect it to be at least as accurate as the majority rule in real courts.
Therefore, a ‘‘predictability gap’’ between the majority rule and
the stochastic block model in ideal courts would reflect the
inability of the latter to capture the little information available in
ideal courts; a predictability gap in real courts would reflect the
existence of a stable block–structure in the voting record.
To investigate these situations, we artificially generate ideal
courts. Given a real court, we generate its corresponding ideal
court by randomly reshuffling, within each case, the votes of the
justices (Fig. 1). By doing that, each case ends up with the same
number of favorable votes as the real case (and, therefore, the
same decision), but correlations between justices across cases are
eliminated.
For these artificially–generated ideal courts, we find that both
the majority rule and the stochastic block model algorithms
correctly predict 71% of individual justices votes (Fig. 2A; see
Methods for the precise definition of predictability). The absence
Figure 1. Court idealization. Each row represents the votes of the nine justices in a case (dark, agreement with the petitioner; bright,
disagreement with the petitioner). We obtain the ideal court (right) from the real court (left) by randomly reshuffling, within each case, the votes of
the justices so that the number of agreements and disagreements is preserved.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027188.g001
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of predictability gap in ideal courts indicates that, lacking any
consistent voting patterns, the stochastic block model is able to
capture the maximum possible amount of information.
For real courts, on the other hand, the block model algorithm
correctly predicts 83% of the individual justices’ decisions (Fig. 2D),
and is therefore consistently more accurate than the majority rule.
Although direct comparison with previous forecasting attempts is
not straightforward, it is remarkable that our algorithm based on
hidden associations between justices is more accurate at predicting
justice votes than forecasts made by legal experts as well as those
made by algorithms that take into consideration the content of the
cases [2,5]. Indeed, while we correctly predict 83% of the votes,
legal experts correctly predicted 67.9% and content–based
algorithms correctly predicted 66.7% [2,5].
Additionally, one needs to consider that the real extent of the
correlations between justices’ voting patterns is obscured by two
facts. First, for unanimous votes, which constitute a significant
fraction of all Supreme Court decisions, both the majority rule and
the stochastic block model correctly predict all of the votes.
Second, for 8–1 votes both algorithms predict eight votes correctly
and one incorrectly. In either case there is no predictability gap.
Since we are interested in non–trivial voting correlations and to
eliminate the effect of these somewhat pathologic situations, we turn
to what we call ‘‘divided votes,’’ that is, votes in which the minority
comprises at least two justices (Figs. 2C–D). In ideal courts, divided
votes are necessarily more difficult to predict than regular votes:
both algorithms accurately predict 53% of the decisions. In real
courts, however, the predictability gap widens and the stochastic
block model algorithm correctly predicts 73% of the votes.
The widening of the predictability gap becomes even more
apparent if we limit our analysis to the cases that are, in principle,
most difficult, namely those resulting in a 5–4 vote (Figs. 2E–F).
Remarkably, while the majority rule only predicts 28% of these
votes correctly, the stochastic block model makes the right
prediction in 77% of the cases. This result may appear as a trivial
consequence of a single ideological left–right divide in the
Supreme Court–that is not the case. Indeed, the most common
5–justice coalition accounts for less than 50% of the 5–4 decisions
of the court [16]; our predictions are more accurate thanks to the
Bayesian approach that we use to average over all possible justice
coalitions and case types.
Besides providing further quantitative evidence for the obser-
vation that justices’ votes are not immune to the their personal
preferences [23–25] and are not independent [17], our approach
enables us to quantitatively investigate historical questions about
the behaviors of individual justices and courts.
Relative predictability
The predictability gap in real courts highlights the existence of
consistent and stable voting correlations between justices, which
our algorithm identifies as justice and case blocks. As we have
shown, these correlations become more apparent as one considers
closer votes. Based on these observations, we define the relative
predictability of a set of votes as the ratio between the
predictability of the votes using the stochastic block model, and
the predictability of hypothetical ideal votes in equivalent ideal courts using
the stochastic block model (Methods). A relative predictability of
one indicates no deviations from ideal behavior, whereas larger
values indicate stable associations between justices.
As discussed above, unanimous decisions and 8–1 votes carry no
information about stable associations between justices and,
consequently, result in relative predictabilities of 1. Therefore, in
the rest of our analysis we consider only divided votes (although all
the results reported hold if one considers all the votes instead).
Figure 2. Average predictability of U.S. Supreme Court votes as a function of the case number (first decision of the court, second
decision of the court, and so on; see Methods for the definition of predictability). Lines represent the moving average (with a window of
+5 cases) of the average over courts for: (A–C) Ideal courts; (D–F) Real courts. (A, D) Predictability considering all decisions; (B, E) excluding
unanimous and 8–1 decisions; (C, F) considering only 5–4 decisions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027188.g002
Predictability of U.S. Supreme Court Votes
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27188
Justice predictability has decreased over time
Virtually any new nomination to the Supreme Court comes
with accusations of judicial bias and/or judicial activism from the
opposition party. This raises, among others, the question of
whether different justices have different predictabilities and, if so,
whether Democrat–nominated justices are more or less predict-
able than Republican–nominated justices.
We find evidence that not all justices are equally predictable
(Fig. 3A). Golberg, the least predictable justice in the period
considered is only 2% more predictable than he would have been
had he voted ideally in an ideal court (although one needs to
consider his short tenure at the Supreme Court). Marshall, on the
other extreme, is 64% more predictable than he would have been
had he voted ideally in ideal courts. Most justices have relative
predictabilities between 1.2 and 1.5 (Fig. 3B). Of note, our
measure of predictability may not correlate with expectations
based on the liberal or conservative attitudes of the justices. For
example, justice Stevens, who is generally regarded as a liberal and
was the easiest justice to predict by experts in Refs. [2,5], is
relatively unpredictable to the stochastic block model. This means
that, liberal or not, for most of his career he did not vote
consistently with the same other justices.
We do not find any evidence that Democrat–nominated or
Republican–nominated justices are more predictable; in fact, both
the most and the least predictable justices were nominated by
Democratic presidents (Fig. 3B). Interestingly, however, we do find
that justice predictability significantly decreased during the period
studied (p= 0.026, Fig. 3C). This global trend seems to be shared
Figure 3. Relative predictability of individual U.S. Supreme Court justices. (A) Each line indicates the average relative predictability (that is,
predictability according to the block model algorithm in the real court over the predictability in an equivalent ideal court) of a justice over their
tenure, which is indicated by the length of the line. Red lines correspond to Republican–nominated justices and blue lines to Democrat–nominated
justices. The background color indicates the party of the president. (B) Histogram of relative predictabilities. Bar colors indicate the fraction of
Republican–nominated (red) and Democrat–nominated (blue) justices within each bin. (C) Relative predictability as a function of the nomination date
of the judge. Relative predictability has significantly decreased during the period considered (p = 0.026, Spearman’s rank correlation), as indicated by
the dashed line (which is only shown as a guide to the eye).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027188.g003
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by Republican–nominated and Democrat–nominated justices, but
is more significant for the former (p = 0.026) than for the latter
(p = 0.063).
Court predictability is lower during Democratic
presidencies
Finally, we investigate the evolution of the relative court
predictability, defined as the average relative predictability of the
votes of each individual justice for each of the first 150 cases
handled by the court (Methods).
As for justices, we find that courts have relative predictabilities
significantly different from each other (Fig. 4A). The most
predictable courts are over 60% more predictable than their ideal
equivalents, whereas the least predictable court (the last Warren
court) is only 7% more predictable than its ideal counterpart. Also
similar to what happens with individual justices, we find no
statistical evidence that courts with more Democrat–nominated
justices are more or less predictable than those with more
Republican–nominated justices.
In terms of its historical evolution, we find that courts have been
significantly less predictable during Democratic presidencies than
during Republican presidencies (p = 0.002; Fig. 4B). In fact, the
largest predictability drop occurs between the 6th and 8th Warren
Courts, coinciding with President Kennedy’s election and
subsequent assassination.
Discussion
Predicting justice behavior is a way to test hypotheses about how
justices make decisions, so that studying such predictions sheds
light in important problems in decision theory and in legal studies
and political science. Here we have studied to what extent can one
predict the vote of a justice from the votes of other justices in the
same case (and the track record of the court). Our approach thus
focuses in the stable correlations between justice behaviors, which,
we argue, reflect consistent attitudes towards the law.
Our approach complements previous attempts to predict justice
behavior from the characteristics of cases alone. In this regard, our
predictions turn out to be more accurate than forecasts made by
legal experts and by algorithms that take into consideration the
content of the cases. We surmise that two main factors explain the
success of the approach. First, contrary to heuristic approaches,
the Bayesian formalism that we use to account for the information
Figure 4. Relative court predictability. (A) The height of each bar indicates the average predictability of a court and its width the time span of
the court. The color of the bar indicates the makeup of the court, with dark blue corresponding to a court with many Democrat–nominated justices,
and dark red to a court with many Republican–nominated justices. (B) Cumulative distribution functions of the relative court predictability for courts
that operated mostly under Democratic presidencies (blue) and Republican presidencies (red). The dashed lines indicate the means of the respective
distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027188.g004
Predictability of U.S. Supreme Court Votes
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27188
encoded in previous Court decisions is the correct probabilistic
treatment of the data for inference of future votes. Second, the
block model is more realistic than one–dimensional (liberal–
conservative) models often assumed in analysis of the judiciary
[16,23,24], which are inspired by classic studies of voting patterns
in Congress [26] (where the one–dimensional approximation is
likely to be more appropriate and is easier to justify). For example,
the block model can account for a justice voting with certain
justices on issues of federalism, and with others in issues related to
civil rights.
We have found that justices are significantly more predictable
than one would expect from an ideal situation in which justice
decisions are uncorrelated. These deviations become more evident
for more evenly divided cases; even in 5–4 decisions, which might
be expected to be the hardest to predict, our algorithm is able to
correctly predict 77% of the individual justices’ votes.
Perhaps more importantly, our approach enables us to
quantitatively investigate a number of questions related to the
historical evolution of the Supreme Court. In particular, we find
that justices that were appointed towards the end of the period
considered were, in general, less predictable than those that were
appointed at the beginning. In addition, we observe that courts
operating during Democratic presidencies have been consistently
and significantly less predictable than those operating during
Republican presidencies.
Providing explanations and contrasting theories for these
empirical observations is beyond the scope of this work. In this
regard, it is important to note that justice attitudes are only
revealed by their votes on cases, so although we focus on justice
correlations it is impossible to separate those from correlations
between cases. That means, in particular, that predictability may
reflect factors that are exogenous to the court, such as the makeup
of the cases on which the court has to rule. For example, a court
may be less predictable if it has to rule on less politically–charged
cases (so justice attitudes play a smaller role), or if it has to rule on
very disparate cases (where there is little information from case to
case).
In any case, we believe that our approach and our findings open
the door for testing such theories in a quantitative manner. More
broadly, we believe that out empirical findings illustrate the sort of
patterns that quantitative analysis of historical data can help to
uncover, and also illustrate how quantitative analysis can help
formulate new questions and hypothesis for historical inquiry
[27,28].
Methods
Outline of the reliability calculations
Formally, a block model M~(PJ ,PC ,Q) is completely
determined by the partitions PJ and PC of justices and cases
into blocks, and a matrix Q whose elements Qab represent the
probability that a justice in block a votes in favor of the petitioner
in a case in block b. Therefore, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
pBM(V
n
1n~1jVn\1)~
1
Z
X
PJ [PJ
PC[PCð
½0,1G
dQ p(Vn1n~1jPJ ,PC ,Q)pBM(Vn\1jPJ ,PC ,Q) p(PJ ,PC ,Q),
ð5Þ
where PJ (respectively PC ) is the space of all possible partitions of
the justices (cases) into blocks, G is the number of distinct block
pairs, and Z is a normalizing constant.
Within the family of stochastic block models, one can evaluate
the likelihood of each model M because the probability of justice i
voting in favor of the petitioner in case j depends only on the
blocks to which they belong. We have that [20]
pBM(V
n\1jPJ ,PC ,Q)~ P
aƒb
Q
lab
ab (1{Qab)
rab{lab , ð6Þ
where lab is the number of votes favorable to the petitioner in V
n\1
between justices in block a and cases in block b, and rab is the
maximum number of such votes (that is, the number of pairs
justice–case such that the justice is in a and the case is in b). Note
that we exclude element (1,n) when computing lab and rab.
Using that p(V
n\1
ij ~1jPJ ,PC ,Q)~Qsisj (where si is the block of
justice i in partition PJ and sj is the block of case j in partition PC )
and assuming no prior knowledge about the models (that is,
p(PJ ,PC ,Q)~const:), one can use Eqs. (5) and (6) to obtain Eq. (3).
Predictability definitions
Let Vij be the vote of justice i in case j (Vij~1 if justice i agreed
with the petitioner in case j, and 0 otherwise), and VAij the
prediction of algorithm A for that vote. The predictability of a set
of S of decisions is
pS~1{
1
ESE
X
(i, j)[S
jVAij{Vij j ð7Þ
where ESE is the number of decisions in the set.
In particular, the predictability pAi of justice i is defined as the
fraction (over the whole career of the justice) of correctly predicted
votes for that justice:
pAi ~1{
1
ECiE
X
j[Ci
jVAij{Vij j ð8Þ
where Ci is the set of cases in which i participated.
Similarly, the predictability pAc of a court is
pAc~1{
1
9ECcE
X9
i~1
X
j[Cc
jVAij{Vij j ð9Þ
where Cc is the set of cases heard by court c.
We define the relative predictability rA of an algorithm A as the
ratio between the predictability of the real rulings over the same
predictability in an equivalent ideal court (obtained as described in
Fig. 1):
rA~
pAc
 real
pAc
 ideal : ð10Þ
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